Boundaries that were supposed to hold

The security pass. Six findings, none reachable by visiting the site and
every one a boundary this codebase says it keeps.

A subagent is pinned to a list of read-only commands, in every mode,
unattended, with no card anybody could approve -- and `find *` was on it.
find writes files with -fprintf, runs programs with -exec and removes them
with -delete, and none of that needs a character the metacharacter guard
refuses. A page the model had just read could ask for a helper and get a
key into authorized_keys, from Plan mode, which promises to change
nothing. Refused in `subject()` rather than trimmed from the list: a
pattern cannot say "and no dangerous flags", and "this one looks
read-only" is exactly what put find there.

The loopback guard missed `0.0.0.0`, which is not is_loopback but does
connect to localhost -- so it answered a *decided* False and skipped the
DNS half too. The one spelling of "this machine" that walked past a guard
whose whole job is that sentence.

Twice in the update helper, which is the one place this deliberately
crosses a privilege boundary: root ran a script the service account owns,
and root sourced a file that account can replace. Either turns a
compromise of the web application into root. The first needed no
compromise at all -- a pull happens as the service user and root runs
whatever it fetched, so control of the branch was control of root. The
old test asserted that exact ExecStart line and had pinned it in place.

Push endpoints skipped check_url, the only outbound request that did. And
a chat could be filed in another account's folder, which hands over its
system prompt -- `_new_chat` resolved the folder, discarded it when it was
not the caller's, and stored the raw id anyway.

An existing helper install keeps the old wiring until install.sh is
re-run; update.sh now says so when it finds itself inside the checkout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/lembas/api/push.py

@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 
 from lembas.api.deps import Db, RequiredUser
 from lembas.db.models import PushSubscription
+from lembas.services import fetch as fetch_service
 from lembas.services import push as push_service
+from lembas.services.fetch import FetchError
 
 log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -61,6 +63,21 @@ async def subscribe(request: Request, db: Db, user: RequiredUser) -> Response:
     if not endpoint.startswith("https://") or not p256dh or not auth:
         return Response(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)
 
+    # The endpoint is a URL the browser hands us and the server later POSTs to,
+    # which makes it the same shape as every other URL a request can name --
+    # and it was the one outbound client in the codebase not going through the
+    # SSRF guard. `https://` alone says nothing about *where*: an internal
+    # address is as valid a URL as Mozilla's push service, and the caller
+    # triggers delivery themselves by sending a message and closing the tab.
+    #
+    # Checked here **and** again before the POST, the split `agent/hosts.py`
+    # uses: a row can predate a DNS change, and this one is stored.
+    try:
+        fetch_service.check_url(endpoint)
+    except FetchError as exc:
+        log.warning("refused a push endpoint from %s: %s", user.email, exc.message)
+        return Response(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)
+
     existing = db.scalars(
         select(PushSubscription).where(PushSubscription.endpoint == endpoint)
     ).first()