Boundaries that were supposed to hold

The security pass. Six findings, none reachable by visiting the site and
every one a boundary this codebase says it keeps.

A subagent is pinned to a list of read-only commands, in every mode,
unattended, with no card anybody could approve -- and `find *` was on it.
find writes files with -fprintf, runs programs with -exec and removes them
with -delete, and none of that needs a character the metacharacter guard
refuses. A page the model had just read could ask for a helper and get a
key into authorized_keys, from Plan mode, which promises to change
nothing. Refused in `subject()` rather than trimmed from the list: a
pattern cannot say "and no dangerous flags", and "this one looks
read-only" is exactly what put find there.

The loopback guard missed `0.0.0.0`, which is not is_loopback but does
connect to localhost -- so it answered a *decided* False and skipped the
DNS half too. The one spelling of "this machine" that walked past a guard
whose whole job is that sentence.

Twice in the update helper, which is the one place this deliberately
crosses a privilege boundary: root ran a script the service account owns,
and root sourced a file that account can replace. Either turns a
compromise of the web application into root. The first needed no
compromise at all -- a pull happens as the service user and root runs
whatever it fetched, so control of the branch was control of root. The
old test asserted that exact ExecStart line and had pinned it in place.

Push endpoints skipped check_url, the only outbound request that did. And
a chat could be filed in another account's folder, which hands over its
system prompt -- `_new_chat` resolved the folder, discarded it when it was
not the caller's, and stored the raw id anyway.

An existing helper install keeps the old wiring until install.sh is
re-run; update.sh now says so when it finds itself inside the checkout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/lembas/api/chats.py

@@ -213,7 +213,13 @@ def _new_chat(
     profile = _agent_target(db, user, kind, ssh_profile_id)
     chat = Chat(
         user_id=user.id,
-        folder_id=folder_id or None,
+        # `folder`, not `folder_id`: the raw value is what the request asked
+        # for, and the lines above already discarded it when it names somebody
+        # else's folder. Storing the raw one put the chat there anyway -- so the
+        # ownership check governed which *seeds* were applied and not where the
+        # chat actually went, and a folder's system prompt is read on every turn
+        # from wherever the chat sits.
+        folder_id=folder.id if folder is not None else None,
         model_id=chosen[0] if chosen else "",
         connection_id=chosen[1] if chosen else None,
         temporary=temporary,
@@ -1940,7 +1946,16 @@ async def update_chat(request: Request, db: Db, user: RequiredUser, chat_id: str
             renamed = True
 
     if "folder_id" in form:
-        chat.folder_id = str(form["folder_id"]) or None
+        # Resolved against *this person's* folders, not taken as given. A folder
+        # is not just a label: `effective_system_prompt` walks up from the chat
+        # through its folder and its parents, so a chat attached to somebody
+        # else's folder would take their system prompt -- reading a setting
+        # across an ownership boundary through a field that looks like a tag.
+        # Unknown or not theirs means no folder, which is the same answer
+        # `_new_chat` gives.
+        wanted = str(form["folder_id"]).strip()
+        folder = db.get(Folder, wanted) if wanted else None
+        chat.folder_id = folder.id if folder is not None and folder.user_id == user.id else None
 
     # The mode is the one agent field that changes mid-chat: it decides what
     # gets asked about, not what the conversation is.