Boundaries that were supposed to hold

The security pass. Six findings, none reachable by visiting the site and
every one a boundary this codebase says it keeps.

A subagent is pinned to a list of read-only commands, in every mode,
unattended, with no card anybody could approve -- and `find *` was on it.
find writes files with -fprintf, runs programs with -exec and removes them
with -delete, and none of that needs a character the metacharacter guard
refuses. A page the model had just read could ask for a helper and get a
key into authorized_keys, from Plan mode, which promises to change
nothing. Refused in `subject()` rather than trimmed from the list: a
pattern cannot say "and no dangerous flags", and "this one looks
read-only" is exactly what put find there.

The loopback guard missed `0.0.0.0`, which is not is_loopback but does
connect to localhost -- so it answered a *decided* False and skipped the
DNS half too. The one spelling of "this machine" that walked past a guard
whose whole job is that sentence.

Twice in the update helper, which is the one place this deliberately
crosses a privilege boundary: root ran a script the service account owns,
and root sourced a file that account can replace. Either turns a
compromise of the web application into root. The first needed no
compromise at all -- a pull happens as the service user and root runs
whatever it fetched, so control of the branch was control of root. The
old test asserted that exact ExecStart line and had pinned it in place.

Push endpoints skipped check_url, the only outbound request that did. And
a chat could be filed in another account's folder, which hands over its
system prompt -- `_new_chat` resolved the folder, discarded it when it was
not the caller's, and stored the raw id anyway.

An existing helper install keeps the old wiring until install.sh is
re-run; update.sh now says so when it finds itself inside the checkout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

tests/test_sharing_grants.py

@@ -209,6 +209,40 @@ def test_the_panel_searches_rather_than_listing_everybody(db, client, registered
     assert "Person 29" in found
 
 
+def test_a_quote_in_the_search_does_not_break_the_panels_buttons(
+    db, client, registered, owner, reader
+):
+    """`hx-vals` carries the values, and it was built by pasting the search term
+    into a JSON string. Jinja escapes the quote for HTML, but the parser decodes
+    it again before htmx parses the JSON -- so a `"` ended the string, made the
+    attribute unparseable, and every checkbox in the panel silently stopped
+    submitting anything. `q` is the last key, so an injected one would also have
+    won a duplicate-key parse.
+
+    Built with `| tojson` over the whole object now, which escapes for JSON
+    first and lets Jinja escape that for HTML. An existing grant is what keeps a
+    row on screen whatever the search says.
+    """
+    import html
+    import json
+    import re
+
+    note = notes_service.create(db, owner=owner, title="Note", body="x")
+    sharing.set_grants(db, note, user_ids=[reader.id], group_ids=[])
+
+    hostile = '", "principal_id": "smuggled'
+    page = client.get(
+        f"/api/library/share/note/{note.id}", params={"q": hostile}
+    ).text
+
+    values = re.findall(r"hx-vals='([^']*)'", page)
+    assert values, "the panel rendered no hx-vals at all"
+    for raw in values:
+        parsed = json.loads(html.unescape(raw))
+        assert parsed["principal_id"] != "smuggled"
+        assert parsed["q"] == hostile
+
+
 def test_an_existing_grant_stays_listed_whatever_the_search_says(
     db, client, registered, owner, reader
 ):