A third side panel, built the way the terminal is and filled the way the inspector is: tabs holding open files. Project files over SFTP in an agent chat; notes, skills, knowledge documents, this chat's text attachments and its own scratch document everywhere. Read with pygments, edited in a plain textarea, saved with a conflict check. A bug found on the way in, and the reason this needed its own read path. `ssh.read_file` ends in `clean_output`, which strips ANSI escapes and decodes with errors="replace" -- right for the output of a command, and fatal for an editor: open a file containing an escape byte, press Save, and you have silently rewritten it with the escapes gone and every undecodable byte replaced by U+FFFD. `read_text`/`write_text` decode strictly, report binary rather than mangling it, carry an mtime:size token for a file that moved underneath, and refuse an oversize write rather than truncating -- `write_file` truncates because a model is told how many bytes it wrote, and somebody pressing Save is not. The model-facing pair is untouched: what it returns is a contract a model has been shown. A truncated read opens read-only for the mirror-image reason. Six sources go through one dispatch table, for the reason tool_labels.py is a table: six independently written permission checks is how one ends up written slightly differently, and that failure looks like editing somebody else's note. A save on a project file bypasses agent/policy.py, which makes it the fourth documented exception to "the modes do not govern the keyboard" and the first that writes. Same argument as the terminal panel -- whoever owns the credential could write the file with scp -- but the consequence is larger and is now said out loud rather than left to be inferred. The model opens tabs from the file tools it was already calling, so no new schema and no tokens. It never brings one to the front: an agent reads forty files in a long reply, and taking the screen each time would drag somebody through all of them and lose any edit in progress. Only the strip is streamed, guarded on truthiness so the frame can never blank itself -- an empty one would close every open tab, the approval card you could press twice with the sign reversed. Both halves are settled on the server, which is why canvas.js needs no guard against a swap at all. No vendored editor. CodeMirror 6 needs a bundler, which is hard rule 1; CodeMirror 5 would be a larger payload than xterm on every page, and xterm is the one heavy dependency precisely because it loads only where it can be used. So: server-rendered highlighting for reading, a textarea for writing, and the panel says there is no colour while you type rather than pretending. Also here: a scratch document per chat, with `scratch_write` at RISK_READ on plan_update's argument, and a test pinning the three numbers that decide a panel's width -- LAYOUT_BOUNDS drops an unknown variable silently, so a panel missing from it has a drag handle that works and forgets. Driven under a DOM stub and against the running application. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
506 lines
20 KiB
Python
506 lines
20 KiB
Python
"""Acting on a machine over SSH.
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Connections are made per call, for the reason MCP sessions are, plus one more: a
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live `SSHClientConnection` is exactly the kind of state `ToolContext` exists so
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that nothing holds. A command is already a network round trip inside a reply
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that takes seconds, so a second one to open the channel is not the cost worth
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optimising.
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**Four asyncssh defaults are actively wrong here, and all four are passed
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explicitly on every connection.** Every LLeMbas user shares one unix account, so
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"whatever the account has lying around" is never the right answer:
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* `known_hosts` unset reads that shared `~/.ssh/known_hosts` -- one trust store
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for everybody. Set to `None` it disables host key checking altogether, which
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is never correct and is the single easiest way to make this insecure.
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* `client_keys` unset loads `~/.ssh/id_*`, so one person's chat could
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authenticate with a key another person left there, or with the server's own.
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* `config` unset reads `~/.ssh/config`, where a `Hostname` or `ProxyCommand`
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can send the connection somewhere else entirely.
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* `agent_path` unset silently uses `$SSH_AUTH_SOCK`.
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`asyncssh` is an optional dependency, imported inside the functions that need it
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so an instance with agents switched off never pays for it and an instance that
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forgot to install it gets a sentence rather than an ImportError at startup.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import contextlib
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import logging
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import time
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from typing import Any
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from lembas.db.models import AUTH_PASSWORD, SshProfile
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from lembas.services.agent.base import (
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Conflict,
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ExecError,
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ExecRequest,
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ExecResult,
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RemoteEntry,
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RemoteFile,
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clean_output,
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revision_of,
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)
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from lembas.services.crypto import decrypt
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log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# A file read into a model's context, and one written out of it. Both bounded:
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# the first because a 40 MB log would fill the window, the second because
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# nothing a model writes in one call should be larger than this.
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MAX_READ_BYTES = 256 * 1024
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MAX_WRITE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
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# How many entries a directory listing returns before it is cut short.
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MAX_ENTRIES = 500
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INSTALL_HINT = (
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"SSH support is not installed. Run `pip install -e \".[ssh]\"` in the "
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"LLeMbas virtual environment and restart."
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)
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def available() -> str:
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"""Empty when SSH can be used, else why it cannot.
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Shaped like `search.availability`, and used the same way: the feature stays
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visible in the UI with an install hint rather than silently missing.
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"""
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try:
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import asyncssh # noqa: F401
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except ImportError:
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return INSTALL_HINT
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return ""
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def spec_from(profile: SshProfile) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""A session-free snapshot of one profile, credential decrypted.
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Called while the session is open. The plaintext lives in the returned dict
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and nowhere else; `generation` drops it when the reply ends.
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"""
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return {
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"id": profile.id,
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"label": profile.label,
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"host": profile.host,
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"port": int(profile.port or 22),
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"username": profile.username,
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"auth": profile.auth,
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"password": decrypt(profile.password_encrypted),
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"private_key": decrypt(profile.private_key_encrypted),
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"key_passphrase": decrypt(profile.key_passphrase_encrypted),
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"host_key": profile.host_key,
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"connect_timeout": int(profile.connect_timeout or 15),
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}
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def connect_kwargs(spec: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Everything asyncssh must be told rather than left to discover.
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See the module docstring: every one of these has a default that is wrong
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when one unix account is shared by every user of the instance.
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"""
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if not spec.get("host_key"):
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raise ExecError(
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"This connection's host key has not been confirmed yet. Open it "
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"under Agents and press Check, then accept the fingerprint."
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)
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keys: list = []
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if spec.get("auth") != AUTH_PASSWORD and spec.get("private_key"):
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import asyncssh
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try:
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keys = [
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asyncssh.import_private_key(
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spec["private_key"], passphrase=spec.get("key_passphrase") or None
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)
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]
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - any failure here is one message
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raise ExecError(f"That private key could not be read: {exc}") from exc
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timeout = int(spec.get("connect_timeout") or 15)
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return {
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"username": spec["username"],
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"port": int(spec.get("port") or 22),
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# Bytes, never None. None turns host key checking off entirely.
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"known_hosts": spec["host_key"].encode(),
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"client_keys": keys,
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"password": (spec.get("password") or None) if spec.get("auth") == AUTH_PASSWORD else None,
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"config": None,
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"agent_path": None,
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"connect_timeout": timeout,
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"login_timeout": timeout,
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}
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async def capture_host_key(host: str, port: int, *, timeout: int = 15) -> tuple[str, str]:
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"""The host's key as a known_hosts line, and its SHA256 fingerprint.
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`get_server_host_key` completes the key exchange and stops, so nothing is
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offered to a host that has not been accepted yet -- no username, no
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password, no key. That is what makes trust-on-first-use safe to do from a
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button rather than only from a terminal.
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"""
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if problem := available():
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raise ExecError(problem)
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import asyncio
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import asyncssh
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try:
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key = await asyncio.wait_for(
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asyncssh.get_server_host_key(host, port=port), timeout=timeout
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)
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except TimeoutError as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"{host} did not answer within {timeout}s.") from exc
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"Could not reach {host}: {exc}") from exc
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if key is None:
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raise ExecError(f"{host} offered no host key.")
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algorithm = key.get_algorithm()
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encoded = key.export_public_key("openssh").decode().split()[1]
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where = f"[{host}]:{port}" if port != 22 else host
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return f"{where} {algorithm} {encoded}\n", key.get_fingerprint("sha256")
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class SshExecutor:
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"""One target, reached over SSH. A connection per call."""
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def __init__(self, spec: dict[str, Any], project_dir: str = "") -> None:
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self.spec = spec
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self.project_dir = project_dir or ""
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self.label = str(spec.get("label") or spec.get("host") or "the remote host")
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def _connect(self):
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if problem := available():
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raise ExecError(problem)
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import asyncssh
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return asyncssh.connect(self.spec["host"], **connect_kwargs(self.spec))
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def _wrap(self, exc: Exception) -> ExecError:
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import asyncssh
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if isinstance(exc, asyncssh.HostKeyNotVerifiable):
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return ExecError(
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f"{self.label} presented a different host key than the one that "
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"was confirmed. Nothing was sent. If the host was rebuilt, open "
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"it under Agents and confirm the new fingerprint."
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)
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if isinstance(exc, asyncssh.PermissionDenied):
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return ExecError(f"{self.label} refused the credential.")
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return ExecError(f"Could not reach {self.label}: {exc}")
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async def run(self, request: ExecRequest) -> ExecResult:
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"""Run one command and read back what it said.
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Every command is a fresh shell, so `cd` does not carry between calls --
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the working directory is set here, from `cwd` or the chat's project
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directory, and never spliced into the command string.
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"""
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import asyncssh
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started = time.monotonic()
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directory = request.cwd or self.project_dir
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# A single-quoted path, with any embedded quote escaped. `cd` needs a
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# shell, so this is the one place a path meets one -- and it is a path
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# from the chat's own configuration, not from the model, except when the
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# model passed `cwd`, which is why it is quoted rather than trusted.
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command = request.command
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if directory:
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command = f"cd {_quote(directory)} && {command}"
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try:
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async with self._connect() as conn:
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result = await conn.run(
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command,
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check=False,
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timeout=request.timeout,
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# Interleaved, because a shell transcript is what the model
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# has to read and separating them loses the ordering.
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stderr=asyncssh.STDOUT,
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# A command that waits for input fails at once instead of
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# sitting out its whole timeout in silence.
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stdin=asyncssh.DEVNULL,
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)
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except TimeoutError:
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elapsed = int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000)
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return ExecResult(
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exit_status=-1,
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output=f"The command was still running after {request.timeout:g}s and was stopped.",
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timed_out=True,
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duration_ms=elapsed,
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)
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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output, truncated = clean_output(result.stdout or "", limit=request.max_bytes)
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return ExecResult(
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exit_status=result.exit_status if result.exit_status is not None else -1,
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output=output,
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truncated=truncated,
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duration_ms=int((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000),
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)
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# --- Files go over SFTP, never through a shell ---------------------------
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# The SSH exec protocol carries one command *string* that the far side's
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# shell parses; there is no argv form. So a path in a command line is
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# unavoidably a quoting problem, and a model-supplied path is exactly the
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# input that must not become one. Over SFTP a path is a path.
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async def read_file(self, path: str, *, max_bytes: int = MAX_READ_BYTES) -> str:
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import asyncssh
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try:
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async with (
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self._connect() as conn,
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conn.start_sftp_client() as sftp,
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sftp.open(self._resolve(path), "rb") as handle,
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):
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data = await handle.read(max_bytes + 1)
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except asyncssh.SFTPNoSuchFile as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"There is no file at {path}.") from exc
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except asyncssh.SFTPPermissionDenied as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"Not allowed to read {path}.") from exc
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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text, _truncated = clean_output(data[:max_bytes], limit=max_bytes)
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return text
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async def write_file(self, path: str, text: str) -> int:
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import asyncssh
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payload = text.encode("utf-8")[:MAX_WRITE_BYTES]
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try:
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async with (
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self._connect() as conn,
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conn.start_sftp_client() as sftp,
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sftp.open(self._resolve(path), "wb") as handle,
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):
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await handle.write(payload)
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except asyncssh.SFTPPermissionDenied as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"Not allowed to write {path}.") from exc
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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return len(payload)
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# --- The same files, for somebody about to edit them ---------------------
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# Deliberately not `read_file`/`write_file`, and those two are deliberately
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# left exactly as they are: what they return is a contract a model has been
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# shown, and it is the right contract for a model.
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#
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# It is the wrong one for an editor. `read_file` ends in `clean_output`,
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# which strips ANSI escape sequences and decodes with errors="replace" --
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# correct for the output of a command, and for a file it means that opening
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# one containing an escape byte and pressing Save rewrites it with the
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# escapes gone and every undecodable byte replaced by U+FFFD. `write_file`
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# truncates at MAX_WRITE_BYTES, which a model is told about and a person
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# pressing Save is not.
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async def read_text(self, path: str, *, max_bytes: int = MAX_READ_BYTES) -> RemoteFile:
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"""A file as somebody is about to edit it.
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Strict decoding, so a file this cannot represent faithfully is reported
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as binary rather than silently mangled into something that would be
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saved back. The stat and the read share one connection: connections are
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per call, so doing it in two is two handshakes and two authentications
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to open one file.
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"""
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import asyncssh
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try:
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async with (
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self._connect() as conn,
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conn.start_sftp_client() as sftp,
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sftp.open(self._resolve(path), "rb") as handle,
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):
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attrs = await handle.stat()
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data = await handle.read(max_bytes + 1)
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except asyncssh.SFTPNoSuchFile as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"There is no file at {path}.") from exc
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except asyncssh.SFTPPermissionDenied as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"Not allowed to read {path}.") from exc
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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truncated = len(data) > max_bytes
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data = data[:max_bytes]
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size = int(getattr(attrs, "size", None) or len(data))
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mtime = int(getattr(attrs, "mtime", None) or 0)
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# A NUL in the first few kilobytes, or anything that will not decode.
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# Either way there is nothing safe to put in a textarea.
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if b"\0" in data[:8192]:
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return RemoteFile("", size, mtime, truncated, binary=True)
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try:
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text = data.decode("utf-8")
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except UnicodeDecodeError:
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return RemoteFile("", size, mtime, truncated, binary=True)
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return RemoteFile(text, size, mtime, truncated, binary=False)
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async def write_text(self, path: str, text: str, *, if_unchanged: str = "") -> RemoteFile:
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"""Write a file, refusing if it moved under the editor.
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`if_unchanged` is the token `read_text` handed out. The re-stat and the
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write happen on one connection, which is the narrowest window SFTP
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allows; there is no compare-and-swap here and this does not pretend to
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be atomic. It catches what it exists for -- another editor, a build, a
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checkout between opening a tab and pressing Save -- and not a race
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measured in milliseconds.
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Oversize is refused rather than truncated. `write_file` truncates
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because a model is told how many bytes it wrote; somebody pressing Save
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would lose the tail of their file with nothing said.
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"""
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import asyncssh
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payload = text.encode("utf-8")
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if len(payload) > MAX_WRITE_BYTES:
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raise ExecError(
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f"That is {len(payload) // 1024}KB and the limit is "
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f"{MAX_WRITE_BYTES // 1024}KB. Nothing was written."
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)
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target = self._resolve(path)
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try:
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async with self._connect() as conn, conn.start_sftp_client() as sftp:
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if if_unchanged:
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current = ""
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with contextlib.suppress(asyncssh.SFTPNoSuchFile):
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attrs = await sftp.stat(target)
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current = revision_of(
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int(getattr(attrs, "mtime", None) or 0),
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int(getattr(attrs, "size", None) or 0),
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)
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if current and current != if_unchanged:
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raise Conflict(current)
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async with sftp.open(target, "wb") as handle:
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await handle.write(payload)
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attrs = await sftp.stat(target)
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except asyncssh.SFTPPermissionDenied as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"Not allowed to write {path}.") from exc
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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return RemoteFile(
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text,
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len(payload),
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int(getattr(attrs, "mtime", None) or 0),
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truncated=False,
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binary=False,
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)
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async def list_dir(self, path: str = "") -> list[str]:
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import asyncssh
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try:
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async with self._connect() as conn, conn.start_sftp_client() as sftp:
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target = self._resolve(path) if path else (self.project_dir or ".")
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names = await sftp.listdir(target)
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except asyncssh.SFTPNoSuchFile as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"There is no directory at {path or self.project_dir}.") from exc
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except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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visible = sorted(n for n in names if n not in (".", ".."))
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return visible[:MAX_ENTRIES]
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async def scan_dir(self, path: str = "") -> list[RemoteEntry]:
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"""A listing with types, for a picker rather than for a model.
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`readdir` rather than `listdir`: the latter returns bare names, and a
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browser has to know which rows can be walked into before it can draw
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them. Directories sort first and then by name, because that is the
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order somebody navigating expects -- `list_dir` keeps its plain
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lexicographic sort, since changing what a tool returns is changing a
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contract a model has already been shown.
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"""
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import stat
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import asyncssh
|
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|
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try:
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async with self._connect() as conn, conn.start_sftp_client() as sftp:
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target = self._resolve(path) if path else (self.project_dir or ".")
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names = await sftp.readdir(target)
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except asyncssh.SFTPNoSuchFile as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"There is no directory at {path or self.project_dir}.") from exc
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|
except asyncssh.SFTPPermissionDenied as exc:
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raise ExecError(f"Not allowed to read {path or self.project_dir}.") from exc
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|
except (OSError, asyncssh.Error) as exc:
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raise self._wrap(exc) from exc
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|
|
entries: list[RemoteEntry] = []
|
|
for item in names:
|
|
name = item.filename
|
|
if name in (".", ".."):
|
|
continue
|
|
attrs = item.attrs
|
|
permissions = getattr(attrs, "permissions", None) or 0
|
|
entries.append(
|
|
RemoteEntry(
|
|
name=name,
|
|
is_dir=stat.S_ISDIR(permissions),
|
|
size=getattr(attrs, "size", None) or 0,
|
|
modified=int(getattr(attrs, "mtime", None) or 0),
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
entries.sort(key=lambda entry: (not entry.is_dir, entry.name.lower()))
|
|
return entries[:MAX_ENTRIES]
|
|
|
|
def _resolve(self, path: str) -> str:
|
|
"""A path relative to the project directory, unless it is absolute.
|
|
|
|
Deliberately *not* a containment check. The account on the far side is
|
|
the boundary -- a profile whose user can only see /srv/project can only
|
|
reach things under it -- and pretending otherwise here would be a
|
|
comfort rather than a control, since `shell_run` could walk out of it in
|
|
one line anyway.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not path:
|
|
return self.project_dir or "."
|
|
if path.startswith("/") or not self.project_dir:
|
|
return path
|
|
return f"{self.project_dir.rstrip('/')}/{path.lstrip('/')}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _quote(value: str) -> str:
|
|
return "'" + value.replace("'", "'\\''") + "'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def check(spec: dict[str, Any], project_dir: str = "") -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
"""Connect, confirm the project directory, and report what was found.
|
|
|
|
Used by the Check button on a profile. Runs one harmless command rather than
|
|
only opening a connection, because "the credential works" and "the directory
|
|
is there" are the two things somebody is actually asking about.
|
|
"""
|
|
executor = SshExecutor(spec, project_dir)
|
|
result = await executor.run(
|
|
ExecRequest(command="uname -sr 2>/dev/null; pwd", timeout=15, max_bytes=4096)
|
|
)
|
|
lines = [line for line in result.output.splitlines() if line.strip()]
|
|
return {
|
|
"ok": result.ok,
|
|
"system": lines[0] if lines else "",
|
|
"cwd": lines[-1] if len(lines) > 1 else "",
|
|
"output": result.output,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
__all__ = [
|
|
"INSTALL_HINT",
|
|
"MAX_ENTRIES",
|
|
"MAX_READ_BYTES",
|
|
"SshExecutor",
|
|
"available",
|
|
"capture_host_key",
|
|
"check",
|
|
"connect_kwargs",
|
|
"spec_from",
|
|
]
|