"Nothing runs on the LLeMbas host" is the sentence the absent sandbox and the
absent local MCP rest on, and an SSH profile aimed at 127.0.0.1 walked straight
past it -- through a real login, with every gate in policy.py still applying,
onto the machine holding the database and the Fernet key. From the SSH layer
down it is indistinguishable from a container on the network, so nothing here
could have noticed.
One switch, three positions: never, one named port, anywhere. The middle one is
the one with a real use -- a container that published its SSH port on the
loopback interface is genuinely somewhere else -- and port 22 is refused even
there, because that one is this host's own sshd.
Enforced in five places, because a row can predate a setting: saving a profile,
`session.resolve` (the control every agent tool, the terminal and the canvas go
through), the composer's picker, browsing, and the draft the panels open against
before a chat exists. Check refuses before it opens its socket rather than after.
And the recognition never resolves a name on the request path. `refusal` runs
several times per page render; the first version of this looked names up inline
and the suite went from two minutes to not finishing. Literal forms are decided
from the string, a name is settled where a network call is already expected, and
the answer lives on the row. The gap that leaves is written down rather than
discovered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The other half of background execution: a job that finishes while nobody is
looking prompts the model back with its result, rather than sitting unread until
the model happens to run again.
The vehicle is the queue, because it is the only wiring that already delivers a
turn into or after a reply. A per-job poller notices completion and calls
jobs.wake. If a reply is being written the completion is left queued for that
reply's _inject/_drain; if the chat is idle a fresh reply is started to answer
it -- the send_queued_now move. All of it under a per-chat lock with no await
between the running-check and ensure, so two jobs finishing at once cannot each
spin up a generation: the second sees the first's reply already live and leaves
its completion for it. That is the invariant the queue exists to hold, reached
from outside a request for the first time.
The completion is a user-role turn whose content names itself a machine event --
"A background job you started has finished" -- not a bare person turn. _inject
sends a queued turn verbatim, so the framing cannot live there; it lives in the
words, the way execute_plan quotes the plan, and a tool.background fragment tells
the model these arrive and are a machine event rather than the person speaking.
The poller reconnects a fresh connection each tick rather than holding one open
-- holding one is the exact live-connection state the whole ssh.py/base.py design
forbids, and poll is self-healing besides. Bounded by background_max_jobs and a
six-hour ceiling, after which the remote job may keep running but we stop
watching it.
A Job table, and here the terminal/generation "lost on restart" precedent does
NOT transfer: those are seconds long with a human watching, a background job is
hours long with nobody watching -- the one case a restart forgetting it would
silently break the feature's whole promise. So the row lets a lifespan startup
hook rehydrate the watcher and wake as if nothing happened. Cancelling a watcher
never stops the detached remote job; it runs on and is picked back up.
Tested end to end against a real local shell: launch a detached command, poll it
to completion through a watcher, and assert the model was woken with the exit
code and output -- plus the lock proving two simultaneous completions start one
reply, not two.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An agent chat will act on a machine you choose, so this is the screen where
you choose it. User-owned like a note, not admin-owned like a connection:
these are somebody's own machines and somebody's own keys, and "anyone in
this group may log in to my server" is a different feature with a different
blast radius. services/sharing.py is deliberately not involved either --
sharing grants reading, and a host somebody else can read is a host they
can log in to.
Trust on first use, made explicit rather than assumed. Adding a host does
not connect to it. Check looks at its key and shows you the fingerprint;
nothing is sent until you accept, because get_server_host_key completes the
key exchange and stops -- no username, no credential. Accepting pins it,
and a host that later presents a different key is refused with the reason
rather than quietly trusted. Moving a profile to another host or port
forgets the pin, since a key belongs to the machine it came from.
Four asyncssh defaults are actively wrong here and all four are passed
explicitly: every LLeMbas user shares one unix account, so `known_hosts`
would be a shared trust store, `client_keys` would authenticate one person
with another's key, `config` would let a ProxyCommand redirect the
connection, and `agent_path` would silently use $SSH_AUTH_SOCK. There is a
test for exactly that, and it needs no server.
Files go over SFTP rather than through a shell. The SSH exec protocol
carries one command *string* that the far side parses, with no argv form at
all, so a model-supplied path in a command line is unavoidably a quoting
problem. Over SFTP a path is a path.
Chat gains its kind, connection, project directory and mode; the first
three are fixed once a chat has a message, because a transcript whose
earlier turns ran somewhere else is not one conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jaroslav Beneš