32003bf8dd638f2cfa589ecacc258e1db9bf6029
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Homer
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96f269dadb |
Boundaries that were supposed to hold
The security pass. Six findings, none reachable by visiting the site and every one a boundary this codebase says it keeps. A subagent is pinned to a list of read-only commands, in every mode, unattended, with no card anybody could approve -- and `find *` was on it. find writes files with -fprintf, runs programs with -exec and removes them with -delete, and none of that needs a character the metacharacter guard refuses. A page the model had just read could ask for a helper and get a key into authorized_keys, from Plan mode, which promises to change nothing. Refused in `subject()` rather than trimmed from the list: a pattern cannot say "and no dangerous flags", and "this one looks read-only" is exactly what put find there. The loopback guard missed `0.0.0.0`, which is not is_loopback but does connect to localhost -- so it answered a *decided* False and skipped the DNS half too. The one spelling of "this machine" that walked past a guard whose whole job is that sentence. Twice in the update helper, which is the one place this deliberately crosses a privilege boundary: root ran a script the service account owns, and root sourced a file that account can replace. Either turns a compromise of the web application into root. The first needed no compromise at all -- a pull happens as the service user and root runs whatever it fetched, so control of the branch was control of root. The old test asserted that exact ExecStart line and had pinned it in place. Push endpoints skipped check_url, the only outbound request that did. And a chat could be filed in another account's folder, which hands over its system prompt -- `_new_chat` resolved the folder, discarded it when it was not the caller's, and stored the raw id anyway. An existing helper install keeps the old wiring until install.sh is re-run; update.sh now says so when it finds itself inside the checkout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Jaroslav Beneš
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5612bf2acd |
A version somebody can read, instead of a sha nobody can
Updates follow a channel now. `stable` is the newest vX.Y.Z tag; `edge` is the branch tip, which is what this did before. Stable is the default, because a branch tip is not a release -- following one means deploying whatever was pushed five minutes ago, possibly mid-feature, which is right for whoever builds this and wrong for whoever runs it. The page can now say "running 1.0.0, 1.1.0 available" rather than showing two shas and leaving somebody to guess. Read with git plumbing and never a forge API, for three reasons in the order they bite. It would need a token on the deployment host -- a credential that can reach the repository, sitting on a box, to answer a read-only question about version numbers. It would tie this to one forge, so a fork on GitHub gets nothing. And it breaks: checked against the Gitea this is developed on, `tea whoami` works and `tea releases list` returns a 500 from a server-side panic about token scopes, so a page resting on that endpoint would have shipped already broken. Release notes still travel, inside the annotated tag object, which `git for-each-ref` reads with no API anywhere. Two details that are only obvious after getting them wrong. A tag with a suffix is not a release: git's version sort puts v1.1.0-rc1 *above* v1.1.0, so accepting one would step a stable host onto a candidate on the strength of a hyphen. And `--sort=-v:refname` rather than a lexical sort, which puts v1.9.0 above v1.10.0 and does it silently the first time a project reaches ten of anything -- there is a test. What is running is `git describe --tags --always`, so it reads "1.0.0" at a tag, "1.0.0-7-gd4f56d" seven commits past one, and a bare sha before the first release ever exists. That last case is what `--always` is for. When it lands exactly on a tag whose name disagrees with __version__, the page says so: a tag cut before the version bump names a release nobody can identify afterwards, and the check costs no subprocess because both facts are already in hand. update.sh resolves the channel the same way and detaches at the tag rather than resetting -- a `reset --hard <tag>` while on main would move the local branch to it, which is a rewrite of a ref nobody asked to rewrite. A host with no tags falls back to the branch and says so, which is every host until the release. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jaroslav Beneš
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ddad585e4b |
An update you can ask for, and a boundary that stays where it was
The button cannot do the work, and that is the whole design. The service runs as an unprivileged account, cannot restart itself, and should not be able to: a web application that can restart its own service is one whose worst day is much worse. So /admin/updates writes a file, and an opt-in systemd .path unit runs deploy/update.sh as root. Three properties hold it up, and each is a thing that could have been got wrong. The request file carries nothing that reaches a command line -- no branch, no ref, no arguments -- because the branch is baked into the unit at install time, so pressing the button is always "deploy the branch this host was configured with" and can never be "deploy something else". It is off unless somebody passes INSTALL_UPDATE_HELPER=1, and re-running the installer without it removes both units and the marker. And without the helper the page says so and prints the manual command rather than writing a file nothing is watching, which would be a button that reports success and does nothing. The card that says all of this is rendered whether or not there is anything to apply. It was inside the "there is an update" branch first, so an administrator could not discover the helper was missing until the day they needed it, which is the worst possible moment. Opening the page makes no network request; Check is the one thing that fetches. And it shows the log between, not a count: "3 behind" is a number somebody has to go and look up, while the subjects are what decides whether this is worth restarting for right now. Docker is one stage, because there is nothing to build -- no Node, no compiled assets. It bakes no secret key (one in an image is one every copy shares, and rotating it makes stored API keys unreadable), no data, and no .git, so /admin/updates inside a container correctly reports that it was not installed from a checkout. Compose publishes on loopback and refuses to start without a key. TLS in front is a constraint rather than a recommendation: the service worker and the microphone both require HTTPS or localhost. The image was built and run before this was committed, which is how the missing COPY of LICENSE was found -- pyproject declares it and the build backend reads it, so the failure reads like a packaging problem and is one line. deploy/lxc-install.sh creates an unprivileged Debian container and runs the existing installer inside it. A wrapper, not a second install path: a parallel installer is two things to keep correct and one of them rots. /healthz opens the database rather than only proving the socket is listening -- a process that is up with a database it cannot open answers every page with a 500 -- and says nothing about what is here, being reachable without signing in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |