4bcacee14360217c7bb66e73a070db2863b40a11
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jaroslav Beneš
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47d1ddbc3c |
Draw a picture, on a ComfyUI you are running
The last unbuilt capability, and built the way CLAUDE.md said it had to be: a
ToolDef reaching resolve_tools plus a permission and a capability flag, not a new
code path. The only genuinely new UI is one branch in the transcript.
services/images/ is three modules. comfy.py speaks HTTP -- submit, poll /history,
fetch the PNG, /free, and an /object_info discovery for the admin page only.
Polled and not socketed, because holding a connection open for the length of a
generation is the live-connection state the whole ssh.py design forbids, and the
thing being waited for takes tens of seconds anyway. The base URL is exempt from
the SSRF guard by construction, exactly as Connection.base_url and the audio
endpoints are -- said out loud in the docstring, because a default of
127.0.0.1:8188 is precisely the shape that guard exists to refuse and therefore
reads as a hole rather than a decision.
workflow.py fills a template, and the one thing that matters is that it walks the
parsed JSON rather than the text of it. A value that is exactly "{{steps}}"
becomes the number 20; ComfyUI validates types and refuses the string. A
placeholder inside a longer string is still text, which is what makes
"{{prompt}}, masterpiece" work -- and text substitution would additionally mean a
prompt containing a quotation mark produced a document that no longer parses, on
the one input guaranteed to hold arbitrary text. Which node holds the prompt is
the administrator's statement rather than a guess from node types: sniffing for
the first CLIPTextEncode works on the shipped workflow and on nothing else, and
swaps positive for negative the first time somebody reorders them. seed has no
fixed default, because one would make every unspecified generation identical and
make the retry loop redraw the same rejected picture four times.
tool.py is one call, one finished image. Returning every attempt to the
conversation would cost a round each, make the ceiling advisory rather than
enforced, and walk the reader past every reject -- so the reviewer lives inside
the tool and is asked about *bytes*: an attempt about to be discarded should not
leave an Attachment behind, so it sees a downscaled preview built in memory and
only the kept image is written. Anything that goes wrong in review is a keep;
losing a picture because a judging request timed out would be the check
destroying the thing it was checking. The last attempt is kept whatever the
verdict, so a request always produces something. Rejects are recorded, not
stored.
Preserve VRAM unloads the chat's own connection and nothing else, because the
memory being freed belongs to one machine: local llama-swap answers GET /unload,
and a box on the network has no reason to be unloaded when ComfyUI wants memory
here. The swap goes round the review rather than round the tool, which costs two
model loads per retry -- so the two settings are independent and the page warns
when both are on. Nothing loads the LLM back: the reply's next request does, and
that step exists in the description and not in the code, so the code says so.
Two rules elsewhere had to be drawn for the first time. message_payload sends
images only on user turns -- no assistant message had ever carried one, and the
moment one does the multimodal list form on an assistant turn is rejected by
OpenAI and most local runners, breaking every later turn in the chat. And
files.store gained keep_original, because _process_image turns anything without
alpha into JPEG q85 at 1400px: right for a phone photo, a visible loss on the one
output this feature exists to produce.
/image sends the ordinary message with force_tool, which becomes tool_choice for
the first round only -- left in place the reply would draw a picture, be asked
again, and draw another. FORCEABLE_TOOLS is an allow list because the name is
read off a form.
ToolContext gained chat_id, and that fixed a tool nobody had ever successfully
run: _run_scratch_write read context.chat_id on a dataclass with no such field,
so every call raised AttributeError, swallowed by run_tool's blanket except into
"the scratch_write tool failed" -- indistinguishable from a model calling it
wrongly. The test that existed asserted the family and the risk, which are
properties of the declaration rather than of the code.
Verified against the real ComfyUI 0.27.0 on this machine rather than against
documentation: every endpoint shape here was read off it, a generation ran end to
end through the client, the reviewer was shown a matching and a mismatched prompt
and answered KEEP and RETRY correctly, and the unload hook fired for the local
llama-swap and not for the remote box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jaroslav Beneš
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5766446b84 |
Files, open beside the conversation
A third side panel, built the way the terminal is and filled the way the inspector is: tabs holding open files. Project files over SFTP in an agent chat; notes, skills, knowledge documents, this chat's text attachments and its own scratch document everywhere. Read with pygments, edited in a plain textarea, saved with a conflict check. A bug found on the way in, and the reason this needed its own read path. `ssh.read_file` ends in `clean_output`, which strips ANSI escapes and decodes with errors="replace" -- right for the output of a command, and fatal for an editor: open a file containing an escape byte, press Save, and you have silently rewritten it with the escapes gone and every undecodable byte replaced by U+FFFD. `read_text`/`write_text` decode strictly, report binary rather than mangling it, carry an mtime:size token for a file that moved underneath, and refuse an oversize write rather than truncating -- `write_file` truncates because a model is told how many bytes it wrote, and somebody pressing Save is not. The model-facing pair is untouched: what it returns is a contract a model has been shown. A truncated read opens read-only for the mirror-image reason. Six sources go through one dispatch table, for the reason tool_labels.py is a table: six independently written permission checks is how one ends up written slightly differently, and that failure looks like editing somebody else's note. A save on a project file bypasses agent/policy.py, which makes it the fourth documented exception to "the modes do not govern the keyboard" and the first that writes. Same argument as the terminal panel -- whoever owns the credential could write the file with scp -- but the consequence is larger and is now said out loud rather than left to be inferred. The model opens tabs from the file tools it was already calling, so no new schema and no tokens. It never brings one to the front: an agent reads forty files in a long reply, and taking the screen each time would drag somebody through all of them and lose any edit in progress. Only the strip is streamed, guarded on truthiness so the frame can never blank itself -- an empty one would close every open tab, the approval card you could press twice with the sign reversed. Both halves are settled on the server, which is why canvas.js needs no guard against a swap at all. No vendored editor. CodeMirror 6 needs a bundler, which is hard rule 1; CodeMirror 5 would be a larger payload than xterm on every page, and xterm is the one heavy dependency precisely because it loads only where it can be used. So: server-rendered highlighting for reading, a textarea for writing, and the panel says there is no colour while you type rather than pretending. Also here: a scratch document per chat, with `scratch_write` at RISK_READ on plan_update's argument, and a test pinning the three numbers that decide a panel's width -- LAYOUT_BOUNDS drops an unknown variable silently, so a panel missing from it has a drag handle that works and forgets. Driven under a DOM stub and against the running application. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |