816f2ae957d4fbb93236f403cfd63bea7560a36d
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Jaroslav Beneš
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816f2ae957 |
A menu for what a chat may use, and three keys
Six smaller things, all of them about the interface not saying what is true.
The @ button only ever inserted the character, which the @ key already does
without a button. It becomes the scope menu: what this chat may use, switched
off per chat. Chat.scope_json is filtered inside resolve_tools AFTER the
capability, permission and instance gates -- exactly as chat.knowledge_bases
narrows knowledge_search -- so a crafted POST turning something on reaches a
tool the gates already removed, and there is a test that writes the column
directly to prove it. Absent means on, for every key, so "why is this off?" has
one answer. It is keyed on the gate rather than the tool name, so notes is one
switch rather than five. The switches carry no role="menuitem", deliberately:
ui.js closes a picker when a menuitem is clicked, which is right for an action
menu and wrong for a list you want to set several of -- which is why the menu
needs no JavaScript at all. Typing @ is untouched.
With no skills, nothing should mention them. tool.skills was gated on the family
alone, so somebody with an empty library was told "the list below gives each
one's name" above no list, handed skill_get, and watched the model spend a round
finding out. It requires skills now; the writing half moved to
tool.skills_write, which is deliberately not gated, because saving the first one
is what somebody with none most needs. And core.tool_list finally reads
tool_names, which had been resolved and documented with no fragment using it.
The composer's toolbar is one row again. .composer__actions is last in the DOM
with margin-left:auto, so the moment an agent chat added a connection, a
directory and a mode, Send and the microphone dropped to a second line.
chat.css has no media queries by design and the fix is not to add one:
.composer__context is the single child allowed to shrink and scroll sideways.
There is a test asserting the file still contains no @media.
The effort picker shows the level in force. "Effort: default" named no level and
was true of nothing in particular; chat.resolved_effort is the chat's own value
and build_request reads the same field, so what is shown is what is sent. The
model's default is a seed, copied onto the row at creation and on a model
change, and never consulted at request time -- a fallback would resurrect it
underneath a cleared effort and make "off" silently do nothing. "off" is a
sentinel and not an empty value, because start_chat declares Form("") and cannot
tell absent from empty: with value="" the reader picks off and gets high.
Alt+M dictates, Alt+R reads the last reply aloud, Ctrl+Enter sends from
anywhere. All three click the button that already does the job, so audio.js
keeps its one delegated listener. Alt+M and not Alt+D, which is the address bar
in Chrome and Firefox. Ctrl+Enter never means Stop -- Send and Stop are the same
element, and Esc already stops. Driven under a DOM stub before committing, per
the rule in CLAUDE.md, and tests/test_commands_js.py pins that every key has a
row in SHORTCUTS, since /help reads that list.
And the memory tooling, which had seven defects. The worst: memory_forget was a
case-insensitive substring first-match delete with nothing warning about it, so
forgetting "coffee" against "Drinks coffee black" and "Allergic to coffee"
silently removed whichever was older -- a wrong deletion nobody would ever find
out about, from a tool whose description invited exactly the short fragment that
misfires. It matches exactly first, then by substring, and refuses an ambiguous
one while naming what it matched. add() refuses an exact duplicate. The
at-the-limit refusal no longer tells the model to delete one to make room: past
the block's budget it is not shown all of them and would be guessing, which
feeds straight back into the first defect. And context.memories no longer claims
the memories "still apply", which nothing checks and which taught a model to
trust a stale one over what the person had just said.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jaroslav Beneš
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4b8fd6bad2 |
A plan it can see is a plan it can keep
Plan mode produced a flat list of steps and then forgot it. Nothing told the
model to look before proposing, nothing let it ask when the scope was
ambiguous, and -- worst -- once execution started the plan was not in the prompt
at all, so it could not have kept it current if it had wanted to.
The shape is findings, objectives and phases of tasks now. Findings are the part
people skip and the part that makes a plan worth reading: what is actually
there, what surprised you, what the plan is working around. Plan mode is told to
research first and to ask with ask_user when the scope is genuinely ambiguous,
in one question rather than three.
steps is still always written, flattened from every phase in order. That is the
whole of the compatibility story: execute_plan reads it and needed no change,
and every row already on disk still works. services/plans.py:normalise is the
only place that knows version 1 existed -- a {title, steps} row comes back as
one phase, so the card, the harness and the Execute button have one shape to
deal with rather than two.
Chat.plan_message_id is what puts the plan in front of the model each turn, with
one primary-key lookup rather than a scan for "the newest message carrying a
plan" -- context_variables is synchronous and sits on the request path.
plan_update is offered only once there is a plan, because a tool for changing
something that does not exist costs a round to find out.
It is RISK_READ, and that sits in tension with notes_edit being RISK_WRITE, so:
risk is what a tool does to the world, and the world the four modes govern is
the machine. This cannot touch it. RISK_WRITE would put an approval card on
screen every time a task was ticked off -- four cards to carry out a four-task
plan, each approving a bookkeeping entry -- which is exactly the interruption
batching exists to prevent. A note is a durable artefact of the reader's that
outlives the chat; this is the chat's own record of what it is doing, nearer to
generation.status. An administrator who disagrees puts it in deny_default.
One thing that nearly went wrong quietly. A runner cannot write the message row,
since _persist is the single writer -- so plan_update returns the merged plan on
its event and the loop carries it. Both calls in a round would then have read
the same stale plan from the database and the second would have won. They merge
into AgentContext.plan instead, the snapshot seeded once when the context is
resolved. Both tools write event["plan"] so _persist stays one writer with one
rule; only plan_submit sets plan_final, which is what withdraws the tools.
The card does not re-render in place. The newest bubble carries the current plan
and older ones carry the plan as it was then -- that is what a transcript is
for, it needs no streaming machinery, and it makes "what did it think at step
three" answerable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jaroslav Beneš
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bc141eae10 |
One round for a chat, as many as it takes for an agent
Two different jobs were sharing one number. A plain conversation asking a question is one round of looking things up and then an answer; the rounds after that were a small model that had decided searching was the answer searching until the context ran out, at a full request each. MAX_ROUNDS is 1 now. Several tools can still be called within that round, which is the thing worth telling the model. The trade is real and worth naming: a plain chat can no longer search and then read one of the results, because reading is a second round. That is what an agent chat is for. An agent chat is sized by Limits instead, where steps is now a runaway backstop and not a working budget. It was 40 and it was reached -- a step count low enough to be the thing that ends a reply is a count that ends it halfway. What bounds one now is the wall clock and a new completion-token ceiling, with zero meaning no ceiling, the same convention index_chars already uses. That ceiling would have been decorative. generation.completion_tokens is only populated when the endpoint sends a usage block, and llama.cpp, Ollama and friends never do; the fallback estimate is computed once, in _run's finally, long after the loop that needs it. So _written takes the larger of reported and estimated, and there is a test that runs the whole thing against a stream reporting no usage at all. A limit that works on OpenAI and silently does nothing everywhere else is the worst kind: one that looks configured. core.rounds could not stay one fragment. "You get at most N rounds" is not the same sentence with a different number in it -- a model told it has a budget rations it and stops early to report progress, which is exactly the behaviour that strands a long piece of work. So it splits: core.rounds keeps the one-round case and gates on a new round_budget variable that _agent_values blanks, and core.keep_working says the other thing to an agent chat. A queued message during a one-round reply is now never taken mid-reply -- there is no work under way to steer -- and falls through to _drain, which gives it a reply of its own. No code change went with that; it falls out of the guard, and there is a test so that "it happens to work" and "it is meant to work" stop looking the same. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jaroslav Beneš
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82a7ef5b58 |
Change part of a file without rewriting it
file_write replaces a file entirely, so a model wanting to change one line either rewrote the whole thing from memory -- silently dropping everything it did not happen to recall -- or shelled out to sed. file_edit takes a unified diff instead, and services/agent/patch.py applies it. Four behaviours carry that module, and each exists because of how models actually write patches rather than how the format is specified. Fuzzy offset, exact content. A hunk header is a hint: models count from a truncated read or from the file as it was three edits ago and get the numbers wrong, and get the context lines right. So the hinted position is tried, then the file is scanned outward for an exact match of the context block. One match wins; more than one refuses, because guessing between two identical blocks is the one failure that silently corrupts a file. Line endings are normalised in and restored out, or every hunk on a CRLF file fails on context that looks identical in the error message. A blank context line that lost its leading space is read as blank, because trailing whitespace is stripped by half the things a model's output passes through. And nothing is written unless every hunk applies: a half-applied file is worse than a refused one, and the model cannot tell the difference without reading it again. It refuses a file this reply has not read, in those words. A patch written from memory either fails on context -- the good case -- or matches something it did not mean. AgentContext.read_paths records what was read; it lives there because runners never see a Generation and a read path is a fact about the machine, and it is shared with the approved copy because as_approved is dataclasses.replace, which copies field references. It resets each reply, and that is right rather than a limitation: tool_calls_json is never replayed, so on the next turn the model does not have the contents either. Writes and edits both render a git-style diff in the transcript now, escaped like everything else there and bounded at write time -- a generated file's diff can be larger than the file, and it sits on the row forever. That costs file_write one extra SFTP round trip to read the old contents, on the hottest agent operation, and it is a conscious trade: it is the difference between seeing what an agent did and having to go and look. It earns its keep twice, because that read also counts as having read the file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jaroslav Beneš
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8a3a225fea |
Two selects that never wrote anything, and a queue
The approval card in Auto mode and the missing /effort were one bug. Both
selects hung their hx-patch on an empty sibling form reached by form="…",
and htmx binds a trigger to the annotated element: change fires on the
select and bubbles to its ancestors, which a sibling is not. The live rows
read agent_mode=manual and params_json={} while the browser showed Auto and
Effort: high. policy.py was never involved.
The verb moves onto the control; the empty form stays as value scoping,
which is the half of the CLAUDE.md note that was right. conftest gains
control_named so a test asserts the element carrying the name carries the
verb, rather than asserting the markup that was there throughout.
The composer's highlight was a third instance of the same carelessness in
CSS: .tok-mention is written for the transcript and scoped to nothing, so
the mirror painted its token in accent-coloured monospace over the
textarea's own text. Scoped under .msg; the mirror restates transparency
and font rather than inheriting them, and bleeds by box-shadow.
/effort is now offered before the first prompt and _new_chat reads it.
/index re-walks the project directory on demand, file_write drops the
listing it just invalidated, and the index ladder falls through to SFTP on
a host that refuses exec instead of returning nothing.
A second message during a reply is queued rather than starting a second
concurrent generation: a real Message row with queued set, so it survives a
restart and can be withdrawn. _drain hands one on at the end of a reply,
_inject takes one in at a tool-round boundary so an agent can be steered
mid-task. Stop leaves the queue undelivered. The terminal's Auto toggle
becomes off/copy/send, and send posts straight to the chat without touching
the composer.
@ now offers notes, skills, this chat's attachments and a URL to fetch; a
knowledge base attaches as a reference rather than a copy. copy_document
carries provenance, which was the one attach path that dropped it.
Also fixes an unrelated live bug: the round loop compared against the
global MAX_ROUNDS of 3 while sizing itself from the agent budget of 40, so
agent replies stopped after three rounds and reported forty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jaroslav Beneš
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16e59feab2 |
Plan mode proposes, and you decide whether to carry it out
`plan_submit` records an ordered set of steps and ends the turn. Offered in Plan mode and nowhere else: it stops the reply, and a model in Auto mode proposing a plan instead of doing the work would be obeying the wrong instinct at the worst moment. The plan is stored on the message rather than parsed back out of the prose, so the button sends exactly what was proposed. It gets one more request to say what it proposed and why -- a bubble containing only a card reads as though the model had nothing to add -- but with the tools withdrawn, so "one more round" cannot become three rounds of it changing its mind about a plan somebody is being asked to approve. Carrying it out switches to Edit, never Auto. The plan was written under a mode where every command stopped for approval, and a button that also removed the asking is not the button anybody pressed. It goes back quoted and attributed, not stated: a plan whose text came out of a file the model read must not arrive in the most trusted role in the transcript wearing the reader's authority. Also closes the rewind gap. Editing or regenerating a turn rewinds the transcript and not the machine, so `rewound_at` is stamped and the harness says so. Nothing tries to undo anything out there -- the project directory is somebody's real working tree, and deleting their work to match a rewound transcript would be far worse than the inconsistency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jaroslav Beneš
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a064407fa7 |
Agent chats run commands, and stop to ask first
The four tools an agent chat has -- shell_run, file_read, file_write, file_list -- and the mode table wired into the loop that decides which of them stop for approval. Verified end to end against a real Kali container over SSH: the card shows the command, allowing it runs it there, and the file it writes is visible from outside. The mode is enforced in `_authorise`, in the generation loop, server-side, keyed on each tool's declared risk. Not in the prompt: a model is told which mode it is in so it behaves sensibly, but everything it reads -- a web page, a README, the output of the last command -- is untrusted, and a rule written only into a system message is one a poisoned file can argue with. Within an agent chat every call goes through the table, including the built-in ones, because notes_edit writes and Plan mode meaning "look but do not touch" has to mean that too. Two things this turned up. The runners re-check the mode as a backstop, and that backstop refused the very thing a person had just approved -- the mode says "ask", and asking was exactly what happened. Approval is now threaded per call, on a copy of the context, because a round runs its calls together and only some of them were allowed. And the harness said nothing at all, because `registry` maps an offered tool *name* back to a family and did not know the agent tools existed. So shell_run resolved to no family and the fragment naming the machine, the directory and the mode was never admitted. The same omission cost custom tools their guidance once already; there is a test for it now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |