a63723713fe500918d5a197324d0d178a6e1fbdc
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jaroslav Beneš
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a63723713f |
Look around the machine before deciding to talk about it
The terminal and the canvas both needed a Chat, so they were missing from the one screen where you are choosing which machine to work on. A draft is the smallest thing that fixes it: an id, and the three facts behind it. The trick is that a draft resolves to a *transient* Chat -- constructed, never added to a session. `canvas.agent_ready`, `_executor`, `_load_agent`, `_save_agent` and `agent_session.resolve` read exactly four attributes between them and none of them queries or writes the row, so all of it works unchanged and nothing had to learn what a draft is. Proven against a real sshd rather than a stub: a transient chat opens and saves a project file over the same SFTP path a real one uses, and the database stays empty throughout. Chats are still created lazily. A draft is not a chat and never becomes one; when the first prompt makes the real one, the shell is re-keyed into it and the open tabs are copied across. `terminal.rekey` moves the registry key *and* `session.chat_id`, because close_for_profile, close_for_owner and the reaper all pop by the field -- a stale one would leave a dead session that `get` keeps handing out. The shell is only adopted when its profile and directory match the chat as finally resolved, since `_new_chat` settles an empty directory to the connection's own; otherwise it is left alone rather than transplanted onto a chat that says it runs elsewhere. Two canvas sources are refused on a draft, by name, and one of them is a hole rather than an inconvenience. `_load_file` authorises with `attachment.chat_id != chat.id`, and an upload made on the new-chat screen is stored with `chat_id=None` -- so a draft whose chat carried no id would make that comparison `None != None`, which is False, and open every unclaimed attachment its owner has. `as_chat` does set an id, so it already fails; the refusal is stated anyway, because a guarantee that lives in an id-shaped coincidence is one the next change breaks without noticing. Adoption needed almost no JavaScript: start_chat already answers with HX-Redirect, so the page reloads and the canvas adopts by construction while the terminal reconnects to the re-keyed session and replays its scrollback -- the "a reload is indistinguishable from a second tab" property working for us. What re-points them mid-screen is a `lembas:agent-target` event, dispatched from `setDir` and the connection select because assigning to a hidden field's value fires nothing on its own. Driven under a DOM stub before committing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jaroslav Beneš
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5766446b84 |
Files, open beside the conversation
A third side panel, built the way the terminal is and filled the way the inspector is: tabs holding open files. Project files over SFTP in an agent chat; notes, skills, knowledge documents, this chat's text attachments and its own scratch document everywhere. Read with pygments, edited in a plain textarea, saved with a conflict check. A bug found on the way in, and the reason this needed its own read path. `ssh.read_file` ends in `clean_output`, which strips ANSI escapes and decodes with errors="replace" -- right for the output of a command, and fatal for an editor: open a file containing an escape byte, press Save, and you have silently rewritten it with the escapes gone and every undecodable byte replaced by U+FFFD. `read_text`/`write_text` decode strictly, report binary rather than mangling it, carry an mtime:size token for a file that moved underneath, and refuse an oversize write rather than truncating -- `write_file` truncates because a model is told how many bytes it wrote, and somebody pressing Save is not. The model-facing pair is untouched: what it returns is a contract a model has been shown. A truncated read opens read-only for the mirror-image reason. Six sources go through one dispatch table, for the reason tool_labels.py is a table: six independently written permission checks is how one ends up written slightly differently, and that failure looks like editing somebody else's note. A save on a project file bypasses agent/policy.py, which makes it the fourth documented exception to "the modes do not govern the keyboard" and the first that writes. Same argument as the terminal panel -- whoever owns the credential could write the file with scp -- but the consequence is larger and is now said out loud rather than left to be inferred. The model opens tabs from the file tools it was already calling, so no new schema and no tokens. It never brings one to the front: an agent reads forty files in a long reply, and taking the screen each time would drag somebody through all of them and lose any edit in progress. Only the strip is streamed, guarded on truthiness so the frame can never blank itself -- an empty one would close every open tab, the approval card you could press twice with the sign reversed. Both halves are settled on the server, which is why canvas.js needs no guard against a swap at all. No vendored editor. CodeMirror 6 needs a bundler, which is hard rule 1; CodeMirror 5 would be a larger payload than xterm on every page, and xterm is the one heavy dependency precisely because it loads only where it can be used. So: server-rendered highlighting for reading, a textarea for writing, and the panel says there is no colour while you type rather than pretending. Also here: a scratch document per chat, with `scratch_write` at RISK_READ on plan_update's argument, and a test pinning the three numbers that decide a panel's width -- LAYOUT_BOUNDS drops an unknown variable silently, so a panel missing from it has a drag handle that works and forgets. Driven under a DOM stub and against the running application. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |