Three features turn out to be one mechanism: a command waiting to be approved, a question the model wants answered, and "this reply is waiting for you" are all — stop the generation, put an interactive block in the bubble, wait for a POST, carry on. So there is one primitive, and the only thing using it so far is `ask_user`: a model can offer you a few answers and a box to write your own. The shell executor is not here yet. This lands first on purpose, because it is the riskiest machinery in the feature and it is worth having working before any subprocess exists to complicate it. Two things about where the pause sits. It pauses a round, not a call: a round's calls run together under a semaphore, and parking four coroutines on four separate answers inside that gather would queue them behind each other invisibly. And Stop had to be taught about it — `cancel` is read between streamed chunks and there are no chunks while paused, so the button did nothing at all until `request_stop` learned to resolve the pause itself. Also here: a risk class on every tool (read, write, execute), which is what the four permission modes will be a table over, and the systemd unit loses ProtectKernelTunables. That last one is not tidying — it bind-mounts /proc/sys read-only, which stops bubblewrap mounting /proc at all, and the obvious workaround would expose this process's environment and with it the encryption key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.0 KiB
Deployment
Installs LLeMbas as a system service behind nginx with a self-signed certificate. Written for a systemd + nginx host; tested on Arch.
| Default | |
|---|---|
| Service user | lembas (system account, nologin) |
| Home | /home/lembas |
| Install prefix | /srv/lembas (bind mount of the home) |
| Checkout | $PREFIX/app |
| Virtualenv | $PREFIX/venv |
| Database | $PREFIX/data/lembas.db |
| Environment | $PREFIX/lembas.env (mode 600) |
| Unit | /etc/systemd/system/lembas.service |
| Vhost | /etc/nginx/conf.d/<host>.conf |
| Listens on | 127.0.0.1:8080 — reachable only through nginx |
The prefix defaults to a bind mount of the service user's home because on many
machines the root filesystem is small while /home is not, and the virtualenv
plus database belong on the larger volume. Set PREFIX=$HOME_DIR to skip it.
First install
SITE_HOST=chat.example ./deploy/install.sh
Idempotent — safe to re-run. It creates the user and bind mount, clones the
repo, builds the venv, generates lembas.env with a fresh LEMBAS_SECRET_KEY,
installs the unit and vhost, issues a self-signed certificate, adds a
/etc/hosts entry if the name does not already resolve, and enables the
service.
Then open https://<SITE_HOST>, accept the certificate warning, and create the
first account — it becomes the administrator.
Everything is overridable from the environment:
| Variable | Default | |
|---|---|---|
SITE_HOST |
lembas.local |
nginx server_name and certificate CN |
APP_PORT |
8080 |
loopback port the service binds |
SERVICE_USER |
lembas |
system account to run as |
HOME_DIR |
/home/lembas |
that account's home |
PREFIX |
/srv/lembas |
install root (bind mount of HOME_DIR) |
REPO_URL |
this checkout's origin |
so a fork deploys itself |
LEMBAS_BRANCH |
main |
branch to deploy |
Deploying a change
git push
./deploy/update.sh
update.sh fetches, hard-resets the deployment checkout to origin/main,
reinstalls dependencies and restarts, printing the commits it pulled. The hard
reset is deliberate: nothing is ever edited in place there, so there is no local
work to preserve and no conflicts to resolve.
Operating it
systemctl status lembas
journalctl -u lembas -f
sudo -u lembas /srv/lembas/venv/bin/lembas info # paths and counts
Configuration lives in $PREFIX/lembas.env. Edit it and restart.
Notes
The secret key is generated once. install.sh will not overwrite an
existing lembas.env. Rotating LEMBAS_SECRET_KEY signs every user out and
makes stored upstream API keys unreadable — they would have to be re-entered.
nginx buffering is off for a reason. Replies stream as server-sent events.
With proxy_buffering on (the default) nginx holds the entire reply and
delivers it in one lump at the end, which is indistinguishable from streaming
being broken. proxy_read_timeout is raised to an hour because a model can
think for minutes before the first token.
Hardening is deliberately moderate. ProtectSystem=full, not strict,
because agent chats run commands. Two lines in the unit are load-bearing and
worth knowing before anyone tidies them:
ProtectKernelTunablesis absent on purpose. With it, bubblewrap cannot start at all — it bind-mounts/proc/sysread-only, and the kernel then refusesmount -t procinside a user namespace. The unit says why, and why the obvious workaround is worse.TasksMaxandMemoryMaxbound the whole service, because a sandbox has no cgroup of its own andRLIMIT_NPROCis counted per uid — the same uid the server runs as.
Local agent execution is off until an administrator turns it on, and the sandbox never binds the deployment prefix, so a command cannot read the database or the encryption key.
Use a real certificate if this is exposed beyond a trusted LAN. The
self-signed cert exists so the install works with no external dependencies;
point ssl_certificate at a real one and nothing else needs to change.